Mercer Law Review
Volume 64
Number 3 Lead Articles Edition - Defining and
Enforcing the Federal Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Article 4

5-2013

Subverting Brady v. Maryland and Denying a Fair Trial: Studying
the Schuelke Report
Bennett L. Gershman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Gershman, Bennett L. (2013) "Subverting Brady v. Maryland and Denying a Fair Trial: Studying the
Schuelke Report," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol64/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Subverting Brady v. Maryland and
Denying a Fair Trial: Studying the
Schuelke Report
by Bennett L. Gershman*
The Schuelke Report' about the ill-fated federal prosecution of the
late-Senator Ted Stevens is an extraordinary contribution to criminal
procedure. No other official documentation or investigative study of a
criminal prosecution, to my knowledge, has dissected and analyzed as
carefully and thoroughly the sordid and clandestine actions of a team of
prosecutors who zealously wanted to win a criminal conviction at all
costs. In examining this Report, one gets the feeling that as the
investigation and prosecution of Senator Stevens unfolded and the
prosecution's theory of guilt unraveled, the prosecutors became
indifferent to the defendant's guilt or innocence. They just wanted to
convict him. Based on depositions of these prosecutors, their e-mails,
notes, memos, conversations, court filings, transcripts of testimony, and
oral arguments, the Schuelke Report methodically and exhaustively
documents the way these prosecutors manipulated flimsy, ambiguous,
and unfavorable evidence; systematically concealed exculpatory evidence
from the defense and the jury; and thwarted defense attempts to locate
that evidence in order to convict a United States Senator and destroy his
career.

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Princeton University (B.A., 1963);
New York University School of Law (J.D., 1966).
1. Report to Hon. Emmett G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the
Court's Order, dated Apr. 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS
(D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://egaltimes.typepad.com/files/Stevens-report.pdf
[hereinafter Schuelke Report].

683

684

MERCER LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 64

OVERVIEW

Ted Stevens, a U.S. Senator from Alaska-and the longest-serving
Republican in Senate history-was convicted on October 27, 2008, by a
federal jury of making false statements on Senate financial disclosure
forms.2 Shortly after the conviction, serious irregularities in the
prosecution of the case prompted the United States Department of
Justice to assign a new team of prosecutors to review the evidence and
the conduct of the trial prosecutors.3 This new team discovered quickly
that exculpatory evidence had been concealed from the defense. The
Justice Department then moved to set aside the verdict and dismiss the
indictment. Federal District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, who had
presided at the trial and had previously held two of the trial prosecutors
in contempt for failing to comply with his order to disclose exculpatory
information to Stevens's attorneys, granted the motion. Judge Sullivan
then appointed Henry F. Schuelke III to investigate and prosecute
criminal contempt proceedings against the six prosecutors who conducted
the Stevens investigation and trial.4
Schuelke's investigation lasted two years and was based on a review
of over 128,000 pages of documents. His 514-page Report was released
on March 15, 2012.' In the Report he concluded that the investigation
and prosecution of Senator Stevens were "permeated by the systematic
concealment of significant exculpatory evidence which would have
independently corroborated Senator Stevens's defense and his testimony,
and seriously damaged the testimony and credibility of the government's
key witness."6 The Report concluded, however, that no criminal
contempt prosecutions should be initiated against any of the prosecutors
under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3),7 because they did not violate a "clear, specific
and unequivocal order" of the trial court that had commanded them to

2. See Neil A. Lewis, Table Turned on Prosecutionin Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2009, http'/www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics/08stevens.html; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (2006).
3. Lewis, supra note 2.
4. Id.; Henry F. Scheulke I,Esq. was appointed by Federal District Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan on April 7, 2009 as Special Counsel to investigate and prosecute criminal
contempt proceedings as may be appropriate against the six prosecutors who conducted the
Stevens investigation and trial. Mr. Schuelke was assisted by William Shields, Esq. Id.
5. Schuelke Report, supra note 1. The Report also contains an "Addendum" with
comments and objections to the Report by the six prosecutors who were subjects of the
investigation. Id. at ix.
6. Id. at 1.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (2002).
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disclose this information that would support a finding, beyond a
reasonable doubt, of criminal contempt.8
The government's prosecution of Senator Stevens focused on the period
between May 1999 and August 2007, when Stevens, as the indictment
alleged, received more than $250,000 worth of renovation and repair
services on his part-time residence in Girdwood, Alaska. These services
were given by VECO Corporation and its owner, Bill Allen, a friend of
Senator Stevens and ultimately the chief witness against him.' The
seven-count indictment charged Stevens with concealing the receipt of
free renovation and repair work by failing to disclose these benefits on
the financial disclosure forms he filed annually with the Senate. 1°
The critical issue at the trial, and Senator Stevens's principal defense,
was his intent. Stevens claimed that he did not intentionally file false
financial disclosure forms because he and his wife, Catherine, believed
that their payments of $160,000 to the contractor they
hired-Christensen Builders-covered the entire cost of the renovation,
and that they did not believe they had received additional free services
from VECO. As the Schuelke Report documents, however, Stevens's
ability to prove his defense was thwarted by the actions of the prosecutors in concealing significant exculpatory evidence that would have
corroborated his defense and their frustrating of repeated attempts by
Stevens's lawyers to obtain this evidence."

8. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 513. Schuelke found that two of the prosecutors-Joseph Bottini and James Goeke--engaged in intentional misconduct by withholding
from the defense significant exculpatory evidence. The Justice Departments's Office of
Professional Responsibility conducted its own post-Stevens investigation and concluded that
Bottini and Goeke engaged in "reckless professional misconduct" but that their misconduct

was not intentional. As a result of their misconduct, Bottini was suspended for forty days
without pay, and Goeke was suspended for fifteen days without pay. See Letter from
Ronald Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Jud. U.S.
Sen., and Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Comm. on the Jud. U.S. House of Rep. (May 24,
2012) availableat http://Www.documentcloud.orgtdocuments/359786-5-24-12-doj-letter-tochairmen-leahy-and-smith-2.html.
9. Allen began cooperating with the Department of Justice in 2006 in the so-called
"Polar Pen" investigation of official corruption in Alaska. He testified pursuant to a plea
and cooperation agreement as the government's major witness against Alaska legislators
Peter Kott and Victor Kohring in 2007, and against Senator Stevens in 2008. Schuelke

Report, supra note 1, at 2. As a direct consequence of the dismissal of the indictment
against Senator Stevens, the convictions of Kott and Kohring were reversed and new trials
ordered. See United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Kott, 423 F. App'x 736, 737 (9th Cir. 2011).
10. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 2.

11. Id. at 5.
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SUMMARY OF CONCEALED EVIDENCE

A. Rocky Williams CorroboratesStevens's Defense, but this
Information is Concealedfrom the Defense
Rocky Williams, a VECO employee and known as "Bill [Alleni's eyes,"
supervised the renovation work on Stevens's home by Christensen
Builders and VECO between 2000 and 2002.12 Williams was slated to
be a government witness to testify to the work done on the home by
Christensen and VECO employees as well as to the value of that
work.'3 Williams was interviewed by the prosecutors four times in
August and September of 2008 in preparation for trial. According to the
prosecutors' handwritten notes of these interviews, Williams repeatedly
told them that after reviewing the Christensen Builders bills, he sent the
bills to Bill Allen along with the additional charges for his time and the
time of other VECO employees, and that it was his understanding that
Allen would add these costs to the Christensen bills before sending the
bills to Stevens.' 4 The prosecutors knew from early in the investigation
that Williams's belief that the VECO expenses were being rolled into the
Christensen bills would corroborate Stevens's defense-that he paid the
Christensen bills in full, believing that the VECO expenses had been
added to these bills and, therefore, did not knowingly and intentionally
file false financial disclosure forms.' 5
The Report suggests that as the case neared trial, the prosecutors
became convinced that Williams might be more of a liability as a
government witness than an asset. Canceled checks and notes from
Williams to Catherine, Stevens's wife, supported Stevens's claim that it
was reasonable for him to believe that VECO expenses were included in
the large Christensen bills.'" Moreover, from Williams's account the
prosecutors became alerted to questions concerning the accuracy of the
VECO time sheets and cost reports, which were going to be used to prove
the value of the benefits to Stevens. Williams acknowledged that he and
other VECO employees did not work full-time on the Stevens renovation

12. Id. at 2 (alteration in original).
13. Id. The government introduced VECO records to prove the value of the renovation
and repair work on Stevens's residence, but the accuracy of these records, as noted below,
was challenged and became a central issue in the case. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. In an internal memorandum the prosecutors described this claim as Stevens's
"primary defense." Id.
16. Id. at 175-76. The Report notes that it was unlikely that Stevens's lawyers would
learn about Williams's exculpatory understanding on their own. Id. at 176.
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17
and, therefore, the VECO records probably were inflated. Finally, a
few days before the trial, Williams did poorly on a mock cross-examination. On the day of opening statements, Williams was sent back to
Alaska, allegedly because of his poor health and need for medical
attention in Alaska. s
The prosecutors never disclosed Williams's understanding to Stevens's
attorneys-which Williams repeated in each of the four pre-trial
interviews and which the prosecutors knew would be Senator Stevens's
principal defense-that VECO costs were included in the Christensen
bills. 9 Indeed, the prosecutors frustrated attempts by the defense to
locate this information. The prosecutors were assured by Williams that
he would not to speak to Stevens's lawyers.2" Williams's exculpatory
statements in his interviews were not memorialized in any of the 302
reports and not disclosed to the defense.21 Instead of including his
exculpatory statements, the only statements by Williams that were
memorialized were two sentences that prosecutors dictated into a 302
report which gave the false impression that Williams's statements
actually were helpful to the government. One sentence stated that
Williams never had any conversations with Ted or Catherine Stevens in
which he told them that VECO expenses were included in Christensen
invoices. The second sentence stated that neither Ted nor Catherine
Stevens ever asked Williams whether the VECO expenses were included
in the Christensen bills.22

17. Id. at 179-81. Indeed, when it became clear during the trial that the VECO records
of the cost of the renovation were inflated and falsely described the work done, Judge
Sullivan halted the trial, stating that "[i]t's very troubling that the government would
utilize records that the government knows were false," and, as a sanction against the
government, struck the records from the jury's consideration. The judge denied a defense
motion for a mistrial. Id. at 398-99.
18. Id. at 180-81. FBI Agent Chad Joy filed a written complaint with the FBI alleging
misconduct by the prosecutors and FBI Agent Mary Beth Kepner in devising a "scheme"
to send Williams back to Alaska after his poor performance in the mock cross-examination.
Id. at 180-88.
19. Id. at 176. The Schuelke Report found that concealing this information materially
prejudiced Stevens's ability to prove his defense. Id. at 500; see Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
20. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 176.
21. Id. at 7-8. In a "Brady letter" to the defense dated August 25, 2008, the
government did not disclose the information provided by Williams just a few days earlier,
and referred to rumors of excessive alcohol use by Williams, when in fact the prosecutors
knew that Williams was an alcoholic. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 7.
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B.

Bill Allen's Role
Bill Allen was VECO's principal executive officer and principal owner.
He became a cooperating witness with the Justice Department in 2006
in connection with the "Polar Pen" investigation into public corruption
in Alaska.2" In 2007, Allen entered a plea agreement and testified as
the government's major witness 'against Alaskan state legislators Peter
Kott and Victor Kohring, and, in 2008, against Stevens.2 4 Allen's
testimony was critical to Stevens's conviction. The government's
concealment of significant Brady information concerning Allen's
credibility was the principal basis for the Justice Department's decision
to seek dismissal of the charges, as well as Judge Sullivan's decision to
appoint Mr. Schuelke to investigate and prosecute criminal contempt
charges against the Stevens prosecutors. 5
C. Allen Suborns Perjury by Bambi Tyree, but This Information is
Concealed from the Defense
Bambi Tyree, a child prostitute, had a sexual relationship with Bill
Allen when she was fifteen years old. In 2004, when she was twentythree years old, she was indicted on drug conspiracy and child-sex
trafficking charges by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Alaska. 2' Tyree
became a cooperating witness against her co-defendant Josef Boehm.
During a trial preparation interview conducted by Assistant U.S.
Attorney Frank Russo and FBI case agent John Eckstein, the first
subject Tyree was questioned about was her relationship with Allen.
Agent Eckstein's 302 report of that interview states:
TYREE had sex with BILL ALLEN when she was 15 years old.
TYREE previously signed a sworn affidavit claiming she did not have
sex with ALLEN. TYREE was given the affidavit by ALLEN's
attorney, and she signed it at ALLEN's request. TYREE provided false
information on the affidavit because she cared for ALLEN and did not
want him to get into trouble with the law.27
Four days later, Russo filed a sealed motion in United States v.
Boehm 28 to limit the cross-examination of Tyree.29 Russo stated in his

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 2; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 9.
Id.
The motion in limine in this case was a sealed motion. Id. at 10.
Id.
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motion that Allen was being blackmailed with threatened public
disclosure of his sexual relationship with Tyree, and that Allen had
asked Tyree to sign an affidavit to falsely swear that she and Allen
never had sex.30 Russo in his sealed reply brief stated: "Allen convinced Tyree to give a false statement to his attorney to defend against
any prospective criminal action."3' James Goeke, an Assistant U.S.
Attorney who assisted Russo in the Boehm prosecution and was one of
the six prosecutors in the Stevens trial, signed the government's sealed
opposition to the defendant's motion for reconsideration, in which he
explicitly referred to Tyree's agreement to make a statement under oath
to Allen's lawyer falsely denying that she had sex with Allen.32 The
Schuelke Report suggests that if FBI Agent Eckstein's 302 report and
the government's sealed pleadings in Boehm had been disclosed to
Stevens's lawyers, Allen's credibility would have been significantly
impeached for having had sex with a fifteen-year-old girl and then
suborning her perjury by getting her to sign an affidavit falsely denying
their sexual relationship.'
The Schuelke Report in over 150 pages describes how the Stevens
prosecutors desperately sought to keep this information from Stevens's
lawyers and the jury, and to orchestrate an elaborate scheme to insulate
themselves from subsequent charges that they violated their disclosure
obligations. Since all of the Tyree information was under seal, the
prosecutors probably knew that it would be inaccessible to Stevens's
lawyers.34 The prosecutors, together with Mary Beth Kepner, the FBI
case agent in the Stevens case, created a sham facade to conceal this
evidence from the defense. Kepner "interviewed" Allen about the Tyree
affidavit and prepared a one-sentence 302 report stating that Allen
never made a false statement under oath and never encouraged others
to do so." Kepner also re-interviewed Tyree and prepared a 302 report
stating that Tyree came up with the idea herself to sign a document to
prevent Allen from being further extorted, and that the content of the
document "was created solely by TYREE with the help of [an] attor36

ney."

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 9-10.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 11-12. That Tyree, a fifteen-year-old, would come up with the idea herself
seemed unbelievable to Agent Eckstein and to AUSA Russo and Goeke. Id. at 200.
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Armed with these denials, the prosecutors then consulted twice with
the Justice Department's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office
(PRAO) about whether they were required under Brady to disclose any
of this information to the defense.37 Interestingly, in seeking advice
from the PRAO, the prosecutors framed the "Question Presented" as
whether a "suggestion" or "recollection" that Allen had caused Tyree to
lie needed to be disclosed under Brady when there was "no evidence" to
back up the allegation.3" To obtain the sought-after PRAO opinion that
disclosure was not required-indeed, to be "blessed" with PRAO's
imprimatur, as one of the prosecutors put it 39 -the prosecutors provided PRAO with "incomplete, inaccurate[,] and misleading information."4 °
The prosecutors did not provide the PRAO attorneys with Eckstein's 302
report or the court pleadings by Russo and Goeke which explicitly stated
that Allen suborned perjury. Not surprisingly, the prosecutors received
the PRAO opinion that disclosure was not called for, and the Stevens
jury never learned that Allen had caused a fifteen-year-old girl to lie
about having sex with him.41
The prosecutors lied to the defense. In the first of two Brady disclosure
letters the prosecutors stated that a pending Alaska Police Department
investigation disclosed that Allen gave some "benefits" to Tyree, but
refused to provide the defense with any more information despite specific
requests.4 2 In the second Brady letter, the prosecutors represented that
they were aware of "no evidence" to support a "suggestion" that Allen
asked Tyree to lie. 4 According to the Schuelke Report,
[tihese astonishing misstatements concealed the existence of documents
and information in [the prosecution's] possession and well known to
them since at least October 2007, namely, Agent Eckstein's 302, his
notes and AUSA Russo's in limine motion in Boehm, which unequivo-

cally documented Ms. Tyree's admission that she lied under oath at
Mr. Allen's request."

37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 227.
39. Id. at 324.
40. Id. at 13.
41. PRAO attorneys stated that their advice would have been different had they known
the true facts. Id. at 228-29.
42. Id. at 290-91.
43. Id. at 300. Although he drafted the Brady letter, Goeke testified during Schuelke's
investigation that the reference to "no evidence" was "inaccurate" and that Agent Eckstein's
notes were "not ambiguous." Id. at 338.
44. Id. at 16.
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D. Absence of Invoices for VECO Expenses Supports Stevens's
Defense, but This Information is Manipulated by the Prosecution
Bill Allen's testimony was used by the government to prove that
VECO made substantial improvements to Stevens's home, the value of
those improvements, and Stevens's failure to disclose those benefits on
his financial disclosure forms. Stevens's principal defense, as noted
above, was that he did not intentionally make any false statements on
his financial disclosure forms. In his opening statement, Stevens's
attorney Brendan Sullivan told the jury that after renovation work had
been completed on Stevens's Alaska residence, and after Allen arranged
for further repairs, Stevens pressed Allen to send him bills for the work
done, but no bills were ever sent. As Sullivan told the jury: "You cannot
report what you don't know."'4
To support his argument that Stevens pressed Allen to send him bills,
Sullivan drew the jury's attention to two notes Stevens sent to Allen in
2002. Referred to in the Schuelke Report as the 'Torricelli note(s),"
these notes were described by Sullivan as evidence that literally "jumps
off the page and grabs you by the throat to show you what the intent of
Ted Stevens was." The two notes from Stevens were sent in October
and November of 2002:
10/6/02
Dear Bill When I think of the many ways in which you make my life easier
and more enjoyable, I lose count!
Thanks for all the work on the chalet. You owe me a bill remember Torricelli, my friend. Friendship is one thing - compliance
with these ethics rules entirely different. I asked Bob P[ersons] to talk
to you
about this so don't get P.O'd at him - it just has to be done
47
right.
Hope to see you soon.
My best,
Ted

45. Id.
46. Id. at 16-17.
47. Id. at 17. Bob Persons was a mutual friend of Senator Stevens and Bill Allen and
a neighbor who informally monitored the renovation work on Senator Stevens's house. Id.
at 16.
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11/8/02
Dear Bill:
Many thanks for all you've done to make our lives easier and our home
more enjoyable....
(Don't forget we need a bill for what's been done
out at the chalet)...
My best

Ted4
Allen was interviewed during the course of the investigation at least
fifty-five times by the prosecution, and Kepner prepared at least sixtytwo FBI 302 reports of these interviews with Allen. Throughout the
investigation, Allen conceded that he did not send bills to Stevens, and
listed various reasons why he did not send them.49 He told the
prosecutors that he never sent an invoice because Stevens probably
would have declined to pay such a high bill, but acknowledged that
Stevens "probably would have paid a reduced invoice if he had received
one."
Allen also said that he did not want to send Stevens a bill
"because he felt that VECO's costs were [much] higher than they needed
to be."51 Allen also stated that he "wasn't sure how to produce an
invoice." 2 Additionally, Allen said that he simply did not want Stevens
to have to pay him.53
The prosecutors obtained the Torricelli notes from Williams &
Connolly, the firm representing Stevens, on April 8, 2008. According to
the Scheulke Report, these notes "immediately became and remained
objects of concern and attention" by the prosecutors.54 However, this
characterization may be an understatement. The prosecutors immediately realized how damaging these notes would be to getting a conviction. Indeed, Kepner believed these notes could prove "fatal" to the case
and could give the Department of Justice "an out" for dismissing the
case.55 The prosecutors advised their superiors about the potential
damage to their case by the notes, questioned the notes' authenticity,
and immediately arranged to meet with Allen on April 15th in Alaska
to interrogate him about the notes.56
This two-hour meeting, which included almost the entire prosecution
team, would become a pivotal event in the case. Twenty-five pages in

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

17 (alteration in original).
25.
393.
25; see id. at 393.
351.
358.
351-52.
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the Schuelke Report are devoted to this meeting. The prosecutors took
copious notes of this interview. Allen told the prosecutors that he
remembered receiving the notes, but that he did not remember speaking
to Persons about the bills requested by Stevens.57 During this session
the prosecutors e-mailed each other back and forth about their concern
and disappointment at Allen's answers.58 E-mails reflect that Allen
and Kepner "had a lot of arguments," and Allen at one point "bl[e]w[
up" at one of the prosecutors who he thought was "pushing too hard" and
the group had to take a break.59 Although Kepner had written at least
sixty-two FBI 302 reports of meetings and interviews with Allen between
August 2006 and September 2008, she did not write a 302 report of the
April 15th meeting because "the debriefing of UAllen did not go well."
Kepner told Allen after the meeting that the prosecutors "were upset"
and "weren't very happy" with his answers and that "you need to think1
a little bit more what they really-what people-what they really done."6
E. Value of VECO Repairs Supports Stevens's Defense, but This
Information is Concealed from the Defense
Allen was also questioned at the April 15th meeting about the value
of VECO's work on the Stevens's residence. As noted above, the
indictment alleged that the value was more than $250,000-an issue
that the prosecutors knew would be contested by the defense.62
However, at the April 15th meeting, Allen was "pretty vociferous" that
the value of VECO's services was not $250,000, and could not have been
more than $80,000.63 According to Allen, the $250,000 number was
coming from Kepner, who "wanted the [$]250,000 from VECO.""
During this interview, Allen and Kepner "had a lot of arguments"

57. Id. at 364. The prosecutors interviewed Persons but did not question him about
whether he met with Allen to discuss the bills. Id. at 25. Persons testified at the trial as
a defense witness and denied ever meeting or talking to Allen about sending bills to
Stevens. Id. at 20 n.6.
58. Id. at 372-74.
59. Id. at 368-72, 384.
60. Id. at 377-78. She failed to write 302s for other meetings and backdated other
302s. Id. at 378 n.50.
61. Id. at 379-80.
62. Id. at 2. AUSA Brenda Morris's opening statement declared that VECO kept track
of the costs "down to the penny," although "whether it's $188,000 or whether it's $240,000
or whether it's $120,000, the defendant still got it for nothing." Id. at 394.
63. Id. at 380-81. None of the FBI 302 reports, IRS reports, or grand jury testimony
contained any of Allen's statements that the value of VECO's work was $80,000. Id. at
386.
64. Id. at 383-84.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

694

[Vol. 64

concerning the value of VECO's work.65 Allen scoffed at the $250,000
figure, telling Kepner "it couldn't be that much."6 "Hell," Allen said,
"the house is not worth that. 6 7 Although Kepner wrote at least sixtytwo FBI 302 reports of meetings with Allen, she did not prepare a 302
report of the April 15th meeting containing Allen's estimate of VECO's
expenses.6 8 Kepner testified in the grand jury in 2007 concerning
Allen's estimate of the VECO costs. She testified falsely that Allen's
initial estimate of the value of VECO's work was "about $100,000" but
that Allen "did not contest" the "substantially higher" value of $250,000
reflected in VECO time sheets.69 Although the prosecutors knew that
one of Stevens's "strongest defenses" would be that the value of VECO's
work was "over-inflated," the prosecutors never disclosed to the defense
Allen's statements that the value of VECO's work was not more than
$80,000.70

F
It

Allen Gives False Testimony, but the ProsecutionFails to Correct

As the prosecutors were preparing for trial, their theory of the case
was that VECO had provided Stevens with more than $250,000 of repair
work on his home, and that Stevens intentionally omitted this substantial benefit from his Senate disclosure forms. A significant problem for
the prosecutors, as noted above, were the statements of Allen, memorialized by the two Torricelli notes, that Stevens pressed Allen for invoices
for the repair work on his home. The prosecution's second Brady letter
on September 9, 2008, summarized Allen's statements, described above,
about the reasons Allen did not send Stevens any bills.7
Then, just before trial, as Allen was about to leave for Washington,
D.C., Kepner said to him "you better figure out or remember what you
done with this Torricelli note from Ted ....You got to figure out what
72 Allen arrived
you done and when did you talk to Bob Persons."
in
Washington on Friday, September 12, 2008, and he and his attorney met
with several of the prosecutors, including Kepner, on September 13 and
14 for trial preparation. It was during the meeting on September 14
that Allen "remembered" a new reason for not sending bills to Stevens:

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 386.
69. Id. at 386-87.
70. Id. at 388-89.

71. Id. at 420.
72. Id. at 430-33 (emphasis in original).
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Allen stated that after receiving the Torricelli note, he spoke with Bob
Persons and that Persons told him "don't worry about getting a bil ....
Ted is just covering his ass."v3 The prosecutors immediately recognized
the significance of this statement-one of the prosecutors became "giddy"
over this new revelation.74 Allen's "recovered memory" fit perfectly the
prosecution's theory that the Torricelli notes were "pretext[s]" to explain
75 The prosecutors
Stevens's failure to disclose the VECO benefits.
never disclosed to the defense this new revelation by Allen, and as noted
above, the defense opened the case on September 25 and proceeded at
trial on the theory that the Torricelli notes were critical evidence that
proved Stevens's innocent intent.
At trial, Allen testified that he recalled speaking with Bob Persons
concerning the Torricelli notes and, specifically, that Persons told him
"don't worry about getting a bill .

. .

. Ted is just covering his ass."76

"[S]hocked" by this "bombshell," the defense interrupted the trial and
sought a mistrial.77 Judge Sullivan denied the motion but ordered the
prosecutors to immediately provide the defense with un-redacted copies
of all FBI 302 reports, IRS reports, and grand jury testimony for all
witnesses. 8
When the trial resumed several days later, the defense cross-examined
Allen in an effort to demonstrate that his story about his conversation
with Persons was a "recent fabrication" that Allen had concocted shortly
before the trial.79 However, Allen steadfastly denied that his reference
to the CYA conversation was a "recent" recollection, and suggested that
he had told the prosecutors about his conversation with Persons much
earlier in the investigation." Allen's denial, however, was false. He
had never mentioned this conversation before, as the prosecutors knew,
and in fact had told the prosecutors at the April 15 meeting that he did
not recall ever speaking to Persons about the Torricelli notes."'

73. Id. at 424, 465. The Schuelke Report refers to this evidence as the CYA ("Cover
Your Ass") statement. Id. at 424.
74. Id. at 453.
75. Id. at 453-54.
76. Id. at 465.
77. Id. at 458, 469, 478.
78. Id. at 469. As noted, none of the fifty-five FBI 302s of interviews of Allen contained
any reference to Allen's CYA statement.
79. Id. at 470-73.
80. Id. at 469-70.
81. Persons testified for the defense and denied ever making the CYA statement. Id.
at 20 n.6.
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However, Allen's false denial was never corrected by the prosecutors.8 2
Every prosecutor claimed to have forgotten Allen's April 15 statement.'
III.
A.

SUBVERTING BRADY AND DENYING STEVENS A FAIR TRIAL

The Prosecutors

The Stevens prosecutors were not amateurs; they were mostly veterans
with considerable prosecutorial experience. Indeed, they were among the
most experienced and accomplished prosecutors in the Justice Department. Their excuses for neglecting their constitutional and ethical
duties, as noted below, appear startling in light of their backgrounds and
experience. Brenda Morris, the lead prosecutor in the Stevens trial, was
the Deputy Chief of the Public Integrity Section with more than twenty
years experience as a prosecutor.8" William Welch was an Assistant
U.S. Attorney in Massachusetts for twelve years and served for two
years as a prosecutor in the Justice Department's Tax Division before
being named Chief of the Justice Department's Public Integrity
Section. 5 Joseph Bottini worked in the Alaska U.S. Attorney's Office
where he held several senior management positions, including Chief of
the Criminal Division, and was assigned as a Professional Responsibility
Officer reviewing agent misconduct and advising prosecutors about their
disclosure obligations.' Nicholas Marsh clerked for a federal judge and
was a junior partner in a prestigious New York law firm before joining
the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, in which he served for
five years.87 Edward Sullivan clerked for a federal judge and worked
at a commercial litigation firm before joining the Justice Department's
Public Integrity Section, where he served for over two years." James

82. Id. at 496. Such correction is mandated under due process. See Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
83. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 507.
84. Id. at 39. Before joining the Public Integrity Section, Morris served as an Assistant
District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney's Office from 1986 to 1991. In
2004, she became PIN's Deputy Chief for Litigation and, in 2007, its Principal Deputy
Chief. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 40-41. Bottini also served as an "anti-terrorism coordinator," the project safe
neighborhoods coordinator, and the"Henthorne coordinator" dealing with agent misconduct
issues. As the Professional Responsibility Officer, Bottini addressed questions raised by
AUSAs, including questions about Brady/Gigliodisclosure obligations. Id.
87. Id. at 41. Nicholas Marsh committed suicide during the Schuelke investigation.
See Paul Duggan, JusticeDepartmentLawyer Kills Self, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A2.
88. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 41. Sullivan was the most inexperienced
prosecutor of the group. He lacked previous training and experience dealing with a
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Goeke clerked for a federal judge and was in private practice before
joining the Alaska U.S. Attorney's Office, where he served for over six
years, becoming Acting First Assistant in 2006.89 Mary Beth Kepner,
who joined the FBI in 1991, was the case agent in the Polar Pen
investigation and in Stevens. She assisted in a federal criminal trial in
Philadelphia in 1998 in which the defendant was granted a new trial on
account of a Brady violation. °
Excuses for'Brady Violations'
A fair reading of the the Schuelke Report demonstrates that the
Stevens prosecutors abandoned their role as ministers of justice and
instead behaved with a reckless and even shocking disregard for their
constitutional and ethical obligations. The Report states: "The investigation and prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens were permeated by the
systematic concealment of significant exculpatory evidence."9 1 In
reviewing the evidentiary materials in the case to determine whether to
disclose information pursuant to Brady, the prosecutors analyzed the
information not with a responsible and professional approach to their
Brady obligations but with a warped and restrictive conception of their
Brady duties. The Stevens prosecutors offered numerous excuses for
their failure to comply with Brady.92 They claimed that they were
unaware of the existence of the Brady information, denied that some of
the information was exculpatory, and claimed that they forgot that the
information even existed. They claimed they had neglected to record
important information, overlooked the need to scrutinize important
source documents, were forced by time pressures to conduct a rushed
and unsupervised Brady review, and given these pressures were forced
to delegate the Brady review to FBI agents and other prosecutors who
were unfamiliar with the case. The prosecutors tried to justify their
conduct by pointing to a compressed trial schedule, a failure of adequate
supervision, micro-management by superiors in the Justice Department,
inexperience, and lack of adequate Brady training.9" Notwithstanding
the U.S. Supreme Court's frequent admonition to prosecutors to err on

B.

prosecutor's Brady obligations. Despite his lack of Brady experience, he was given
significant Brady disclosure responsibilities. Id.
89. Id. at 42.
90. Id.; see United States v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 543, 561-64 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
91. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 1.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id.
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the side of disclosure,94 the Schuelke Report shows that the Stevens
prosecutors did just the opposite.95
C. Dysfunctional Review for Brady Information
The Brady rule presupposes that prosecutors in preparing for a trial
will closely review all of the materials in the case, including notes,
reports, and testimony of police investigators and witnesses, to
determine whether any favorable information exists which should be
disclosed to the defense. It would be unusual-even startling-for a
prosecutor to delegate this Brady review to persons who are unqualified
to undertake that responsibility, either because they lack a clear
understanding of the Brady rule itself or do not have a thorough enough
knowledge of the case, including knowledge of all of the relevant
information and documents in the case.
But as the Schuelke Report shows, this is exactly the kind of Brady
review that was undertaken in Stevens. As one of the prosecutors
candidly acknowledged, "it was not a procedure calculated to be
successful." 6 For example, Agent Kepner stated that she and other
IRS agents were instructed by the prosecutors to review their reports
and notes for Brady information, specifically for materials that would be
"helpful" to the Stevens defense team. 7
However, Kepner never
received any instructions as to what the term "helpful" meant. Having
some rough knowledge of the Giglio rule, Kepner understood that she
should be looking for information that "reflect[ed] badly on a witness." 8
Because of this flawed and confusing instruction, she did not look for
inconsistencies between a witness's statements in an interview and a
witness's testimony in the grand jury, or inconsistencies between
information provided by different witnesses.9 9
Making this dysfunctional process of Brady review even worse, none
of the Stevens prosecutors supervised the review of Brady information,
and even employed other prosecutors in the Public Integrity Section who
were not assigned to the Stevens case to conduct the Brady review.10 °

94. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) ("[Plrudent prosecutor will err on

the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the
wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108
(1976) ("[Prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.").
95. See Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 1.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 82 ("[In hindsight, it wasn't the best way to do it.").
Id. at 64.
Id. at 64-65 (alteration in original).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 74-98.
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Morris, the lead prosecutor in Stevens, did not know who was in charge
of the Brady review.101 She believed that agents' notes of witness
interviews were not reviewed for Brady information. Morris made
numerous representations to the court that the government was aware
of its Brady obligations and had met them. 10 2 However, these representations were false and dishonest. She based these representations on
her unfounded and unexplained belief that everybody on the trial team
was doing his or her job. 0 3 Nobody on the trial team took responsibility for the Brady review. Indeed, it appears that the least experienced
prosecutor on the Stevens trial team was responsible for the Brady
review by "default[];" and other more experienced prosecutors looked to
him as "a clearing house or a focal point for [the Brady review]. " 1° 4

But as the Schuelke Report shows, this prosecutor had neither the
knowledge nor the experience to accomplish this task successfully.0 5
D. Failure to PrepareInvestigative Reports
The FBI Manual states unequivocally that whenever a person being
interviewed could be called upon to testify at a future trial or other
proceeding, the interview shall be reported on FD-302.'° 6 As the
Schuelke Report shows, there were many occasions when prosecutors
along with FBI agents interviewed witnesses and no 302 reports were
prepared. As examples, Kepner prepared no 302 report after the critical
April 15 interview with Bill Allen in which the Torricelli notes were
discussed.0 7 No 302 report was prepared after the April 15 interview
of Allen in which Allen repeatedly stated that the cost of renovations
was about $80,000, and not $250,000.10s A key interview of Stevens's
legislative assistant, Barbara Flanders, disclosed that Stevens expected
to receive VECO bills but this interview, which was unhelpful to the
government, was not memorialized in a 302 report.'0 9 During the trial
preparation session on September 14 when Allen suddenly remembered
the "cover your ass" statement, Kepner did not write a 302 even though

101. Id. at 77.
102. Id. at 81.
103. Id. at 81-82 ("I thoroughly believed that [Agent Kepner] was as smart as most
lawyers, and I thoroughly believed that the team knew most of this evidence, again,
because this wasn't the first trial.").
104. Id. at 85.
105. See id. at 87.
106. FBI MANUAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES, pt. II, § 10-13.3.
107. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 352.
108. Id.
109. Id. One of the prosecutors commented that this information is "not good." Id.
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every prosecutor at the meeting immediately realized the significance of
this new information. 10
The Schuelke Report suggests that one of the reasons the officials did
not prepare 302 reports was that these reports, which would have to be
disclosed to the defense, might damage the government's case. At the
April 15 interview of Allen, for example, Allen's assertion that he did not
send any invoices to Stevens suggested to the prosecutors that Allen
"was trying to set things up with Stevens so that Stevens wouldn't have
to pay it back.""' The prosecutors were noticeably disturbed by
Allen's statements because his statements implied that Stevens was
always intending to pay invoices for work done but that Allen did not
send him any invoices. Kepner stated that "no FD-302 was ever
prepared [of the April 15 interview of Allen] because it was her
recollection that the debriefing of Bill Allen did not go well.""'
Needless to say, the failure to prepare a 302 report memorializing a key
witness's prior discrediting statements denies the defendant the
opportunity to confront the witness with relevant ammunition to attack
that witness's credibility and damage the prosecution's case.
E.

ManipulatingContent of Investigative Reports

In addition to the government's failure to prepare investigative
reports, the Schuelke Report also reveals how the prosecutors and agents
manipulated the content of the investigative reports they did prepare to
provide a dishonest and misleading version of the event. As noted
above, Rocky Williams, who was in charge of the renovation and repair
work on Stevens's house, repeatedly told investigators that he believed
that the VECO expenses were included in the invoices submitted by
Christensen Builders, which Stevens paid in full."3 But this assertion
was omitted in the 302 report of the interview of Williams. Instead, the
302, which was dictated by prosecutors to Agent Joy, stated that
Williams never specifically told Stevens that the VECO expenses were
added to the Christensen bills, and neither Ted nor Catherine Stevens
ever asked Williams whether the VECO expenses were included."4
The prosecutors, when confronted by this misleading report, could not
explain the reason for recording only the part of the interview that

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 353.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 150-51.

2013]

STUDYING THE SCHUELKE REPORT

701

the part of the interview
favored the government's case, or for omitting
115
case.
government's
the
disfavored
that
Similarly, when the government was preparing a search warrant for
Stevens's home, relying in large part on information supplied by Allen,
the prosecutors were aware that Allen had suborned Tyree's perjury and
recognized that this information might have to be disclosed to the judge
who would issue the warrant. The prosecutors had recalled interviewing
Tyree a few years earlier, and she stated that her false affidavit was her
idea. Agent Kepner, who signed the affidavit for the search warrant,
interviewed Allen before making her warrant application. She prepared
a 302 report of her interview containing one sentence: "[Mr. Allen] has
never made a statement under oath that he l knew was false or
misleading nor has [Mr. Allen] encouraged others to make a false
statement under oath." 6 Kepner did not disclose the information
about Allen's subornation of perjury in her application for the search
warrant.117
Redacted Investigative Reports
As noted above, one of the central issues in the trial was whether
Stevens intended to conceal benefits from VECO on his financial
disclosure forms. During a critical interview about Allen's failure to
send Stevens invoices of VECO work, Allen informed the government
that he believed that if he had sent Stevens a bill for repair and
renovation work on his home, Stevens would have paid the bill." 8
This statement was documented in an FBI 302 Report, but was blacked
out of the report when the report was provided to the defense pursuant
to the court's pre-trial discovery order."9 In the middle of Allen's
testimony, the prosecution provided the defense with a less-redacted
copy of the report and another redacted IRS report that had not been
previously provided to the defense that contained the above statement-that if Allen had invoiced Stevens, Allen believed that Stevens
would have paid the bills. 2 ° The prosecution claimed that the excul-

F

115. Id. at 156-57, 161. One of the prosecutors speculated that perhaps he thought this
information was "new information" and the omitted information was something he had
heard before. Id. at 157.
116. Id. at 204 (alteration in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 395-96.
119. Id. at 395. The redacted 302 report (referred to in the Schuelke Report as the
"Pluta 320") was provided to Stevens's lawyers pursuant to the Court's pre-trial discovery

order. Id.
120. Id. at 396.
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patory information in these reports was "inadvertently redacted."'
Judge Sullivan, clearly disturbed by the government's conduct, ordered
the prosecution to immediately provide the defense with un-redacted
copies of all FBI 302 reports, IRS reports, and grand jury testimony for
122
all witnesses.
G.

Failure to Take Notes
Federal prosecutors and their agents typically document their
interviews with witnesses by writing notes and preparing investigative
reports. However, the Schuelke Report indicates that the prosecution
and law enforcement agents understood it to be the "standard practice"
not to take notes of trial preparation interviews of witnesses to protect
against having to memorialize statements that may be damaging to the
government's case.123
Needless to say, the absence of notes prevents the defense from
learning about information from a witness that may be favorable to the
defense in revealing false and inconsistent statements in a witness's
account, and denies the defense the ability to confront the witness's
testimony with relevant impeachment material. As one court observed,
such a practice is a "risky business" and "demeans" the primary duty of
prosecutors to see that justice is done.'24
H.

Failureto Review Notes for Brady Information
The government is required to disclose Brady information contained
in rough notes of witness interviews taken by prosecutors and their
agents. 25 Disclosure, of course, requires the prosecution to carefully
review their notes for any Brady information. It appears that some of

121. Id.
122. Id. However, Allen's statements that the value ofVECO's work was about $80,000
was not reflected in any FBI 302, IRS, or grand jury testimony, and was never provided
to Stevens's lawyers. Id.

123. Id. at 112-13. It should also be noted that prosecutors during pre-trial witness
preparation allowed witnesses to read transcripts of their grand jury testimony. Id. at 112.
It should be further noted that Bill Allen did not testify in the grand jury; Kepner
summarized his information, thereby avoiding memorializing testimony from Allen that
could be used at trial to impeach him. Id. at 70.

124. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1289 (1st Cir. 1996); see also United

States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 225 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (suggesting that although
government has no duty to take written notes for defendant's benefit, government may be

violating its disclosure duty by instructing agents not to follow customary practice of taking

notes of witness interviews).
125. See United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States
v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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the Stevens prosecutors recognized that their notes could contain Brady
information.'2 6 Nevertheless, none of the prosecutors reviewed their
notes for Brady material or were even aware of their obligation to do
so. 2 ' The lead prosecutor, Brenda Morris, did not review her notes
12
Even
and was not aware that any prosecutors' notes were reviewed.
though she was familiar with the review requirement, she testified in
the Schuelke investigation that reviewing prosecutors' notes for Brady
purposes "would never even cross my mind.""' Another prosecutor did
not review his notes because "I didn't have time to and I wasn't asked
to."13° Another prosecutor stated that he did not receive any formal
training on taking and reviewing notes, and "nobody asked me to go
back and look at my notes." 3 ' Another prosecutor claimed that
although he did review his notes, he did not review his notes of the
critical April 15 interview of Bill Allen because he forgot about the
meeting and his folder containing the notes was mislabeled."'
I.

Summary Disclosure of Brady Information

The government's production of Brady material was in the form of a
summary description of evidence that identified in a general manner
potentially favorable information.'33 The government argued that its
Brady obligation was satisfied by summarizing a prior statement of a
witness that might constitute a basis for impeachment, and insisted that
it was not legally obligated to produce FBI 302 reports except when
required by the Jencks Act.13 The defense contended that a summary
of the evidence was meaningless and needed to be disclosed in a "useable
format," the specific term used by the trial court in ordering Brady
disclosures. "'
One glaring instance of the misuse of this summary format is the
reference in the Brady letter to the "suggestion" that Allen had suborned
TPyree's perjury.'36 Instead of providing the defense with the critical

126. Schuelke Report, supra note 1, at 440.
127. Id. at 451.
128. Id. at 460.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 448.
131. Id. at 446.
132. Id. at 440.
133. Id. at 53-55.
134. Transcripts of the grand jury testimony of two witnesses were the only source
material provided by the prosecutors to the defense. All other Brady information was
summarized. Id. at 86.
135. Id. at 53-54, 58.
136. Id. at 300.
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source documents-statements made by Agent Eckstein, and Assistant
U.S. Attorneys Russo and Goeke-the letter stated, dishonestly, that the
government had conducted a "thorough investigation" and was "unable
to find any evidence to support it." 137 The letter concluded: "Because the
government is aware of no evidence to support any suggestion thatAllen
asked [7Tree] to make a false statement under oath, neither Brady nor
138
Giglio apply."
J.

Manipulationof E.Discovery
The prosecution initially provided the defense with electronic
documents. The production was voluminous. It was prepared by a
litigation technologist-manager in the Alaska U.S. Attorney's Office who
assembled and organized the material in the hard drive into sub-folders
for each source. 139 One of the trial prosecutors instructed this official
"to dump all the documents into one directory with single-page [TIFs]
because he didn't want to make it easy for them." 140 This official
stated that this prosecutor's view was that "producing the documents in
single-page [TIFs] would make document review more difficult for [the
defense team]. " " When the lead prosecutor in Stevens was interrogated by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility,
she stated that after she learned that the TIF format made document
review more difficult, she concluded that her colleague "had played
games with the TIF stuff... thinking it was cute."'
K

Lack of Supervision over Brady Disclosures
Shortly before the Stevens indictment was ified, the head of the
Justice Department's Criminal Division changed the trial team and
designated Brenda Morris to be the lead prosecutor. 4 3 This decision
appears to have had profound consequences for the prosecution's morale,
cohesiveness, and effectiveness.'" It also had important consequences
for the prosecution's compliance with Brady. Morris remembered this
as the "beginning of a horrible experience."" The superseded prosecu-

137. Id. at 300 (emphasis in original).
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 104.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 104-05. Hard copies were subsequently provided to Williams & Connolly
at their expense. Id. at 104.
143. Id. at 44.
144. See id. at 44-46.
145. Id. at 45, 321.
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tors considered this decision a "slap in the face" and considered
quitting.'" William Welch, a member of the prosecution team and
chief of the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, believed that
this decision "would have a very detrimental and explosive impact on the
team, and in fact that's exactly what happened." 4 7
Appointing Morris as the lead prosecutor necessarily had Brady
consequences. 14 Morris had virtually no knowledge about the Stevens
case, nor the Alaskan "Polar Pen" investigation. She did not feel
comfortable with witnesses, felt considerable pressure to focus 14on the
case, and did not have the knowledge to write the Brady letter.
In addition, tension and disunity among the displaced prosecutors may
explain in part the failure in some instances to comply with Brady.5 °
For example, Dave Anderson, one of the VECO employees, testified in
the grand jury that he did not work on the renovation of Stevens's home
for several months in 2000. This testimony contradicted the VECO cost
report, which was introduced into evidence at the trial. However,
Anderson's grand jury testimony was not disclosed to the defense. The
prosecutor who was responsible for disclosing the first Brady disclosure
letter did not disclose Anderson's testimony because he did not know the
details of that part of the case. In addition, the prosecutor who
introduced into evidence the VECO cost report did not know that
Anderson's testimony151contradicted information in the report and should
have been disclosed.

L. ManipulatingEthical Advice
One of the most cynical events in the Stevens prosecution was the way
the prosecutors finessed the issue of Allen's subornation of Bambi
Tyree's perjury by obtaining two ethics opinions from the Justice
Department's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) that
enabled the prosecutors to suppress information that would have
severely undermined Allen's credibility.'52 The prosecutors knew that
information existed that clearly showed that Allen caused Tyree to swear
to a false affidavit.153 The prosecutors were also in possession of
information that appeared to show that the false affidavit was Tyree's

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45-46.
See id. at 321.
Id.
See id. at 71-74.
Id.
See id. at 225-27.
Id. at 226.
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idea and notes that appeared to corroborate that view.l" However, in
seeking ethical advice from PRAO on whether the prosecution needed to
disclose the information documenting Allen's subornation of perjury, the
prosecution provided PRAO with a skewed and misleading version of the
record in order to obtain the sought-after opinion.'
Thus, in presenting the question to PRAO-whether disclosure was
required when an Assistant U.S: Attorney "thought" that a key witness
once had asked someone to lie and when there was "no evidence" to
corroborate that information and "all the evidence they can find rebuts
that information"-the prosecutors omitted all of the information that
documented the subornation and gave the PRAO officer only information
that supported the opinion that no disclosure was required.5 6 The
prosecution informed PRAO of the following: that the AUSA "thought"
that Tyree told him that Allen asked her to lie; that another AUSA
remembers that Tyree told him it was her idea, not Allen's; that the FBI
agent recalls that Tyree said it was her idea; that Tyree says it was her
idea; that Allen never asked her to lie; that the FBI Agent's 302 report
is not clear; and that the AUSA's notes show that Tyree denied that
Allen asked her to lie.'
However, this description of the factual basis for the opinion is
dishonest. And the prosecution's claim to the Schuelke investigators
that "[wie had disclosed everything we had to PRAO" is obviously
false.15
FBI Agent Eckstein's notes, which were not disclosed to
PRAO, are not "unclear"; they clearly state that Allen solicited Tyree's
false statement. There is no evidence that Tyree "denied" that Allen
asked her to lie. Nor did the prosecutors disclose to PRAO the Assistant
U.S. Attorney Russo's unequivocal representation to the court in its
motion in limine in Boehm that Allen asked Tyree to lie. Clearly, had
PRAO been given a complete recounting of the facts, it could not have
issued its opinion.
IV. AFTERTHOUGHTS-SOME LESSONS FROM THE SCHUELKE REPORT

In reading the Schuelke Report, one is struck by the parallel between
a post-conviction post-mortem into a massive breakdown in the federal
criminal justice system-which is essentially the purpose of the Schuelke
investigation-and the post-mortem of a massive breakdown in a
commercial facility, or an instrumentality of commerce. An investigation

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 225.
See id. at 226-28.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 241.
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into a commercial or transportation breakdown is legally mandated and
fairly routine. But an investigation into a breakdown in a federal
criminal trial is anything but routine; it is virtually unheard of.
Although other countries employ commissions or fact-finding bodies to
inquire into controversial or high-profile cases that appear to have
miscarried, 5 ' the American legal system typically does' not review
aberrations in its own justice system.5 ° There is no institutional
mechanism in the United States to review after-the-fact a breakdown in
the justice system to try to learn why it happened and suggest recomBy probing carefully and
mendations to prevent its recurrence.'
thoroughly into a colossal and tragic breakdown in federal criminal
justice, the Schuelke Report opens a window into how several prosecutors behaved and raises troubling questions on whether the legal system
is capable of protecting persons accused of crimes when prosecutors
break the rules.
Moreover, given the fact that the Stevens prosecutors engaged in such
flagrant and pervasive misconduct in such a public case, one wonders
what kinds of misconduct are committed in less publicized prosecutions
that do not invite the kind of public scrutiny and after-the-fact
investigation as Stevens. Indeed, it appears that it was only because of
the voluntary post-conviction review by a new team of prosecutors that
violations were discovered that caused the Justice Department to
dismiss the case. But this type of post-conviction review rarely happens,
especially Brady violations, often remain unexposed and
and violations,
2
unknown.

6

The Schuelke Report also reminds us that no matter how focused and
aggressive defense lawyers may be in seeking to obtain discovery
material-and the attorneys for Senator Stevens were among the best
in the nation-their efforts will often be futile if a prosecutor is bent on

159. Lissa Griffin, CorrectingInjustice: Studying How the United Kingdom and the
United States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 107 (2009).
160. But see id. at 109 n.27.
161. One idea that seems to be gaining traction is the establishment of post-conviction
review bureaus within prosecutor offices to investigate whether certain defendants have
been wrongfully convicted. See EstablishingConviction Integrity Programsin Prosecutors'
Offices, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law (2012).
162. Brady violations by definition are unknown and unlikely to be discovered. See
United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) (Brady information "unlikely to
be discovered"); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (Brady
evidence "may never emerge from secret government files"). This suggests that some
institutional mechanism similar to the U.K.'s Innocence Commission should be developed
to provide for post-conviction review after appeals and habeas petitions have been
exhausted, especially in cases in which there are colorable claims of innocence.

708

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

concealing this evidence. By the same token, notwithstanding a trial
judge's diligent supervision of discovery and energetic actions to enforce
a prosecutor's disclosure obligations-and Federal Judge Sullivan
repeatedly admonished the prosecutors to comply with their discovery
obligations-such actions also may be futile if a prosecutor is bent on
concealing information.
The Schuelke Report did not ahswer the most difficult question of all.
Why did the prosecutors do it? What motivated them to break the law?
It is worth speculating whether the flagrant and pervasive misconduct
by the prosecution team reflected a "gang" mentality. With so many
prosecutors involved in the prosecution, each prosecutor might have
believed that he or she would be able to deflect responsibility for his or
her actions and the consequences of those actions on to the other
prosecutors. With responsibility thus shared, the prosecutors might be
emboldened to violate rules with impunity. Moreover, with a collective
prosecutorial mindset bent on winning a conviction, there was no one to
bring professional training and ethical oversight to bear. With one
exception, these were veteran prosecutors. Professional training may
have had a perverse consequence in providing insights on how to game
the system and get away with it. By the same token, investigative and
courtroom experience-which virtually all of these prosecutors possessed-may have made it easier for them to subvert Brady. Given the
colossal breakdown in Stevens by such experienced people, it may be that
no institutional mechanism is capable of enforcing the Brady rule. It
may be that a prosecutor's own personal integrity and sense of fair play
are the only effective checks on a prosecutor's crossing the ethical line.
The Schuelke Report did not offer specific recommendations to improve
the discovery process in federal prosecutions. But several suggestions
were implicit in the Report. First, it appears that to enforce full and
timely discovery, a judge may need to make a specific order to prosecutors, preferably in writing, to require prosecutors to comply with their
discovery obligations, and specifically their Brady obligations. Second,
there should be one prosecutor assigned as the "disclosure officer" with
the responsibility to review the file and make appropriate Brady
disclosures.163 The disclosure officer should use a checklist outlining
all of the possible items that could be disclosed under Brady, and
indicate which categories of information are included in the disclosure
and which are not included. Brady disclosures by means of a summary
letter should be used only if the materials that form the basis for the
163. Such a disclosure officer is employed in the United Kingdom to review police files
and make disclosures. See Lissa Griffin, PretrialProceduresfor Innocent People:Reforming
Brady, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 969, 993 (2012).

20131

STUDYING THE SCHUELKE REPORT

709

summary are included. And finally, Brady legislation should be
enacted-either as an amendment to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure or as an independent Brady statute16'-explicitly
defining the prosecutor's disclosure responsibility, specifying the kinds
of information that must be disclosed and the timing of such disclosure,
and providing sanctions for non-compliance. This legislation should
specifically provide that prosecutors must disclose potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without regard to whether the failure
to disclose may likely affect the outcome of the trial.

164. In the aftermath of the Stevens case, a Brady statute has been proposed to provide
for disclosure of favorable information in federal criminal prosecutions. See Fairness in
Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).

